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Cultural distance as a determinant
of bilateral trade flows: do
immigrants counter the effect
of cultural differences?
Bedassa Tadessea,* and Roger Whiteb
aDepartment of Economics, University of Minnesota, Duluth, MN-55812,
United States
bDepartment of Economics, Franklin and Marshall College, Lancaster,
PA-17603, United States
We introduce ‘cultural distance’ as a measure of the degree to which shared
norms and values in one country differ from those in another country, and
employ a modified gravity specification to examine whether such cultural
differences affect the volume of trade flows. Employing data for US state-
level exports to the 75 trading partners for which measures of cultural
distance can be constructed, we find that greater cultural differences
between the United States and a trading partner reduces state-level exports
to that country. This result holds for aggregate exports, cultural and
noncultural products exports as well, but with significantly different
magnitudes. Immigrants are found to exert a pro-export effect that
partially offsets the trade-inhibiting effects of cultural distance.
I. Introduction
Despite a voluminous literature on the immigrant-
trade relationship, the effects that cultural differences
between immigrants’ home and host countries may
have on trade flows and the extent to which
immigrants may counter these effects have received
little attention. Cultural difference is defined as the
degree to which shared norms and values differ from
one country to another (Hofstede, 2001). Pronounced
cultural differences may make it difficult to under-
stand, anticipate and predict the behavior of others
(Elsass and Vieiga, 1994), and people from dissimilar
cultures may have considerably different perceptions
of the same situation or series of events (Doz and
Hamel, 1998). As such, cultural differences can
complicate interactions, hinder the development of
rapport and trust and, thus, carry the potential to
increase transaction costs and reduce the likelihood
that international trade will occur. In examining the
influence of cultural differences, we use data for the
year 2000 that represents US state-level exports to 75
countries for which cultural distances can be con-
structed. We extend the immigrant-trade link litera-
ture by relating cultural distance, immigration and
trade flows for aggregate state-level exports and,
separately, for two broad product classifications:
cultural and noncultural products.
Prior research documents the existence of an
immigrant-trade link and reasons that immigrants
influence trade via two direct channels: (i) their
preferences for home country goods when desired
*Corresponding author. E-mail: btadesse@d.umn.edu
Applied Economics Letters ISSN 1350–4851 print/ISSN 1466–4291 online  2010 Taylor & Francis 147
http://www.informaworld.com
DOI: 10.1080/13504850701719983
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Ta
de
ss
e,
 B
ed
as
sa
] 
At
: 
13
:0
3 
30
 N
ov
em
be
r 
20
09
products or acceptable substitutes are not available in
their host countries (a transplanted home bias effect),
and (ii) their connections to business or social
networks and/or knowledge they may possess regard-
ing political and social obligations required to
conduct business in their home countries (the
exploitation of network connections). White (2007),
Bandyopadhyay (2006) and Wagner et al. (2002)
review the associated literature. We hypothesize that
immigrants also indirectly increase trade by counter-
acting the trade-inhibiting influence of cultural
differences (distances) between their home and host
countries. We contend that the initiation and conduct
of transactions between individuals in different
countries depends, in part, on the extent to which
shared norms and values differ across countries. To
explore this notion, we estimate cultural distances
between the United States and each trading partner in
our data set based on two dimensions of culture:
Traditional vs. Secular-Rational authority (TSR) and
Survival vs. Self-Expression values (SSE). Using
mean values for the TSR and SSE dimensions, the
cultural distance between each home country j and
the United States (country i) is calculated as CDij ¼ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
TSRj  TSRi
 2þ SSEj  SSEi 2q . While the TSR
dimension reflects a contrast between societies
in which deference to the authority of a God, the
nation or to the family is considered important or an
expectation (Traditional authority) and societies in
which individualism and self-expression are stressed
(Secular-Rational authority), the SSE dimension
reflects differences between societies that emphasize
hard work and self-denial (Survival values) and those
that place greater emphasis on quality of life issues,
such as women’s emancipation and equal status for
racial and sexual minorities (Self-Expression values).
II. Theoretical Framework, Empirical
Model and Data
Following the lead of prior studies, we employ the
gravity model of trade and derive our econometric
specification by definingMij, country j’s imports from
state i, as a function of income, geodesic distance and
several trade-inhibiting (transaction costs) and trade-
facilitating factors. In its basic form, the gravity
model posits that country j’s imports from state
iðMij Þ increase with the trading partners’ combined
economic mass, given as the product of the incomes
of the exporting state (Yi) and of the importing
country (Yj), and decrease as geodesic distance (GDij),
a proxy for transportation costs, increases. We also
include a vector of variables, represented by the
expression expðXij1  Xij2Þ, that affects the like-
lihood of trade being initiated and/or an increase in
the volume of transactions already taking place,
where Xij1 is a vector of the ratio ðCDij=IMijÞof
cultural distance between the United States and
country j and the stock of immigrants from country
j living in state i, and Xij2 is all other trade inhibiting/
facilitating factors described in the modified gravity
model of Head and Ries (1998). Thus our theoretical
model can be described as:
~Mij ¼ 
Y1i Y
2
j
GD3ij
exp
CDij
IMij
 
Xij2
  !
ð1Þ
Equation 1 postulates positive and negative effects
on trade for the stock of immigrants and cultural
distance, respectively. It also indicates that the extent
to which cultural distance affects trade may be
influenced by the stock of immigrants from country
j living in state i. In addition, it predicts strictly
positive realizations of imports. Since trade data
often contain numerous cases of zero imports and
exports, following Eaton and Tamura (1994) and
Head and Ries (1998), we modify Equation 1 to
obtain a specification that allows for zero realization
of trade values.
~Mij ¼ 
Y1i Y
2
j
GD3ij
exp
CDij
IMij
 
Xij2
 
þ "ij  
 !
ð2Þ
The subscript k is the constant of proportionality,
"ij is an assumed identically and independently
distributed error term, and  is the fixed amount of
trade that is subtracted from the level predicted by
Equation 1. When the latent import value is negative,
observed imports will be zero. Thus, the observed
data on country j’s import from state i can be
described as: Mij ¼ max½M

ij;0. Substituting this
identity, rearranging the resulting expression,
expanding the vector Xij2, and taking natural
logarithms where appropriate, results in our estima-
tion equation.
ln Mij þ 
  ¼ þ 1 lnYi þ 2 lnYj  3 lnGDij
 1 lnCDij þ 2 ln IMij
þ 3 ln CDij  ln IMij
 
þ 1 ln Yi
POPi
þ 2 ln Yj
POPj
þ 3 lnOPENj þ 4 lnEXRATEij
þ 5FTAij þ 6LLOCKj
þ 7ENGLISHj þ "ij ð3Þ
148 B. Tadesse and R. White
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Ta
de
ss
e,
 B
ed
as
sa
] 
At
: 
13
:0
3 
30
 N
ov
em
be
r 
20
09
Following Eaton and Tamura (1994), we estimate
our model as a tobit specification where aggregate
exports and exports of cultural and noncultural
products, measured at the state-level, are inter-
changed as dependent variables. Export data are
from the World Trade Atlas (GTI, 2006), and
our classification of exports into cultural and non-
cultural products follows UNESCO (2005).
State-level immigrant population data are from the
2000 decennial census (US Census, 2006a). Our
measure of cultural distance is constructed using
World Values Survey and European Values Survey
data (Inglehart et al., 2004). Home country income
and population data are from the World Bank (2006),
while Gross State Product (GSP) data are from the
US Bureau of Economic Analysis (2006). GSP per
capita is constructed as GSP divided by state
population (US Census, 2006b). Monetary values
have been normalized to constant 1995 US dollars.
The remaining explanatory variables are standard
in most studies that employ the gravity model.
OPENj, the sum of each country’s imports and
exports divided by its GDP, measures a country’s
propensity to trade. The change in the annual
US-home country exchange rate captures terms of
trade effects. Expressed as foreign currency units per
US dollar, an increase in this variable is expected to
decrease US exports. Capturing the effects of trade
agreements, FTAij is equal to one if country j is party
to a trade agreement with the US during 2000. As
common language has been identified as an important
determinant of trade flows (Dunlevy, 2006;
Hutchinson, 2002), we include a dummy variable
which is equal to one if English is commonly used in
country j (CIA, 2006). Finally, to represent a
potentially important geographic impediment to
trade, we include a dummy variable which is equal
to one if country j is landlocked. Table 1 presents
descriptive statistics.
III. Empirical Results
Table 2 presents the marginal effects of the
explanatory variables in our empirical model. In
each set of results, the first model presents the basic
specification where we account only for the effect of
immigrants. The second model augments the basic
specification by including the cultural distance
variable, and the third model includes cultural
distance and an interaction term between the
immigrant stock and cultural distance variables.
The effects of immigrants from country j residing in
state i on state-level exports are given, jointly, by the
coefficients on the immigrant stock variable (IMij)
and the term which interacts the immigrant stock
with the measure of cultural distance (CDij IMij).
Consistent with earlier studies, results from our
basic specification indicate that immigrants exert
significant pro-export effects. Given that we employ
the tobit estimation technique and we have the
parameter , the resulting coefficients are not true
elasticities. However, as the values of  relative to
median state exports levels are small, we can
heuristically interpret the coefficients as elasticities.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Dependent variables Mean (SD)
Aggregate exports 148 407 678 (1 008 056 826)
Non-cultural products exports 144 788 823 (990 537 894)
Cultural products exports 3 618 855 (29 441 546)
Geodesic distance (in miles) 8886.02 (3019.398)
Cultural distance 1.3477 (0.5112)
Stock of immigrant population 6300.71 (74 743.11)
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 271 189 386 173 (632 845 671 676)
GDP per capita 13 028.41 (11 154.74)
State Gross Domestic Product (GSP) 191 158 901 961 (227 921 025 648)
GSP per capita 34 387.96 (11 356.62)
 ln exchange rate 0.113 (0.1554)
Open 0.8445 (0.4801)
English 0.3733 (0.4838)
FTA 0.04 (0.196)
Landlocked 0.20 (0.4001)
N 3825 (51 ‘states’ 75 home countries)
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Accordingly, a 1% increase in the immigrant stock
residing in state i increases aggregate exports from
that state to the immigrants’ home countries, on
average, by 0.047%. The corresponding influences of
immigrants on state-level exports of cultural and
noncultural products are estimated to be 0.033 and
0.046%, respectively. A Chow test (at p50.001)
rejects the null hypothesis of the equality of
coefficients across cultural and noncultural product
classifications. This indicates that the pro-export
effect of immigrants on noncultural products is
greater than the influence of immigrants on
cultural products. Given that we are dealing
with exports (rather than imports) and that non-
cultural products account nearly for 97% of
the average state’s exports, this finding is not
surprising.
Supporting our hypothesis, results obtained when
estimating Model 2 (where we augment the basic
gravity specification with the cultural distance vari-
able) imply that greater cultural distance between the
United States and its trading partners reduces
aggregate state-level exports by 0.29%. This effect is
significantly larger (0.49%) on exports of cultural
products as compared to exports of non-cultural
products (0.27%). The pro-export effects of immi-
grants, however, remain robust. Turning to the
results from the third specification (Model 3), in
which we examine whether immigrants can help
overcome the negative effects of differences in
shared norms and values on trade, differentiating
the results with respect to cultural distance and
multiplying the coefficients with mean of immigrant
stock (in log), we find that the trade inhibiting effects
of cultural distance is reduced to 0.141% on
aggregate exports, and 0.386% and 0.144% on the
exports of cultural and noncultural products, respec-
tively implying that immigrants reduce the negative
effects of cultural distance on trade flows; however,
the effect is not sufficiently large to completely
eliminate the negative effects of cultural distance.
IV. Conclusion
Our results indicate that immigrants promote US
state-level exports to their home countries at the
aggregate level and for both cultural and noncultural
product classifications. Consideration of cultural
distance as a determinant of trade flows reveals that
greater cultural differences between immigrants’ host
and home countries inhibit international trade. While
the pro-export effect of immigrants does act to offset
the influence of cultural distance, it is not sufficiently
large to completely counteract the export-inhibiting
effects of cultural distance.
References
Bandyopadhyay, S., Coughlin, C.C., and Wall, H.J.
(2006) Ethnic Networks and US Exports,
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working
Paper 2005-069A.
Doz, Y. L. and Hamel, G. (1998) Alliance Advantage: The
Art of Creating Value through Partnering, Harvard
Business School Press, Boston, MA.
Eaton, J. and Tamura, A. (1994) Bilateralism and
regionalism in Japanese and U.S. trade and foreign
direct investment patterns, Journal of the Japanese and
International Economies, 8, 478–510.
Elsass, P. M. and Viega, J. F. (1994) Acculturation in
acquired organizations: a force-field perspective,
Human Relations, 47, 431–53.
Global Trade Information Services, Inc. (GTI) (2006)World
Trade Atlas, State Export Edition. Available at http://
www.gtis.com/state (accessed November 2006).
Head,K. andRies, J. (1998) Immigration and trade creation:
econometric evidence from Canada, Canadian Journal
of Economics, 31, 47–62.
Hofstede, G. (2001) Culture’s Consequences: Comparing
Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations,
Across Nations, 2nd edn, Sage Publications,
Thousand Oaks, CA.
Inglehart, R., Basanez, M., Diez-Medrano, J., Halman, L.
and Luijkx, R. (Eds) (2004) Human Beliefs and Values:
A Cross-cultural Sourcebook based on the 1999–2002
Values Surveys, Siglo Veintiuno Editores, S.A. de C.V.,
Mexico City.
United Nations (UNESCO) (2005) International Flows of
Selected Cultural Goods and Services, 1994–2003:
Defining and Capturing the Flows of Global Cultural
Trade, UNESCO Institute for Statistics, UNESCO
Sector for Culture, Montreal.
United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census (2006a) Statistical Abstract of the United
States: 2006, 126th edn, United States Government
Printing Office, Washington, DC.
United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census (2006b) Foreign-Born Profiles STP-159.
Available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/
socdemo/foreign/STP-159-2000tl.html
US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis (2006) Regional Economic Accounts.
Available at http://www.bea.gov/regional/gsp/
United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (2006)
CIA World Fact Book. Available at https://www.cia.
gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html
Wagner, D., Head, K. and Ries, J. (2002) Immigration and
the trade of provinces, Scottish, Journal of Political
Economy, 49, 507–25.
White, R. (2007) Immigrant-trade links, transplanted home
bias and network effects, Applied Economics, 39,
839–52.
World Bank (2006) World Development Indicators: CD-
ROM Version, Washington, DC, Development Data
Group of the World Bank’s International Economics
Department.
Cultural distance, immigrants and trade 151
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Ta
de
ss
e,
 B
ed
as
sa
] 
At
: 
13
:0
3 
30
 N
ov
em
be
r 
20
09
Appendix Country Listing
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia,
Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada,
Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador,
Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Korea (South),
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia,
Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia,
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda,
Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela,
Vietnam, Zimbabwe.
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